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POISED AT THE THRESHOLD: SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION, LAW, AND THE LAW 
SCHOOL CURRICULUM IN 
THE NINETIES 
Jane S. Schacter* 
LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW. Edited by William B. Ruben-
stein. New York: The New Press. 1993. Pp. xxi, 569. $30. 
If timing is everything, then Bill Rubenstein 1 got it just right. The 
publication of Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law, the first comprehen-
sive work on sexual orientation and the law suitable for use as a law 
school casebook, could hardly have come at a more propitious time. 
The events of 1993 brought a new high profile to the contested rela-
tionship between sexual orientation and the law. In terms of sheer 
media saturation, nothing rivaled the controversy over lifting the ban 
on gay men and lesbians in themilitary,2 but that was by no means the 
only issue that put gay rights so decisively on the national screen. Ho-
mosexuality and the law collided conspicuously elsewhere, including 
in the growing spate of antigay ballot measures, 3 a constitutional chal-
lenge to Colorado's restrictive referendum measure, 4 a Hawaii 
Supreme Court decision portending the possible legalization of gay 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B. 1980, Michigan; J.D. 1984, 
Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Ann Althouse, Juliet Brodie, Howard Erlanger, and Kathleen 
M. Sullivan for insightful comments on an earlier draft. This research was generously supported 
by the Smongeski Bequest administered by the University of Wisconsin Foundation. 
1. Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's national Lesbian and Gay Rights Project 
and lecturer at Harvard Law School, where he has taught a course on sexual orientation and the 
law. 
2. For a description of the so-called "don't ask, don't tell" policy that the controversy 
spawned, see Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Spells Out Rules for Ousting Homosexuals: Rights 
Groups Vow a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1993, at Al. For perspectives on the military ban and 
its history, see ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE (1990); RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT 
UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993). 
3. Lisa Keen, Referendums and Rights: Across the Country, Battles Over Protection for Gays 
and Lesbians, WASH. Posr, Oct. 31, 1993, at C3. 
4. Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) ~ 42,719 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) 
(ruling that the Colorado Constitution's Amendment 2, which invalidates local gay civil rights 
laws and bars the enactment of future state or local gay civil rights laws, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution); see also Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) 
(earlier decision by the Colorado Supreme Court upholding a preliminary injunction preventing 
the enforcement of Amendment 2 pending trial and finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on the 
merits of their constitutional challenge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993); see generally Note, 
Constitutional Limits on Anti·Gay Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1905 (1993). 
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marriage in that state, 5 a judge's ruling in Virginia denying a lesbian 
custody of her young son, 6 and heated debates over the right of gays 
and lesbians to march in St. Patrick's Day parades.7 The new primacy 
of gay-related issues was as much political and cultural as legal. A 
massive crowd of gay men and lesbians and their supporters marched 
on Washington in support of civil rights,8 covers of major national 
magazines turned to the subject,9 and, by midyear, the unlikely phe-
nomenon of "lesbian chic" was extensively noted in the mainstream 
press. 10 
Rubenstein's book thus comes at a time when many have called the 
law's stance toward sexual orientation sharply into question. Basic 
premises about homosexuality - its definition, its properties, its place 
in contemporary collective life - are the subjects of intense debate. 
What seems clearest, for the moment, is that normative legal questions 
about sexual orientation will face close examination and, perhaps, pro-
gress toward resolution in the 1990s. 
Fortunately, good timing is not the only quality that distinguishes 
Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law. Rubenstein, director of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and a lec-
turer on sexual orientation and the law at Harvard Law School, has 
masterfully collected, organized, and edited the emerging body of law 
governing homosexuality, as well as a wide range of nonlegal materials 
that provide perspective on and insight into the social fact of homosex-
uality. Nothing that preceded this book had its depth and range. 11 
5. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.) (ruling that, under the state constitution's equal 
rights clause, a statute restricting marriage to male and female partners is presumed to be uncon-
stitutional and must be invalidated unless, at trial, the state can show a compelling state interest 
and can demonstrate that the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of 
constitutional rights), reconsidered in part and clarified, 14 Haw. 645 (1993). 
6. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 1993, at A16. 
7. Tom Mashberg, Gays and the Parade: Boston, New York City Views Differ, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1993, at 3; Richard Perez-Peiia, Judge Allows Group to Bar Gay Marchers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at 21. 
8. Richard L. Berke, Milestone for Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at Al. 
9. See, e.g., ATLANTIC, Mar. 1993; NATL. REv., Apr. 26, 1993; NATION, May 3, 1993; NEW 
REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993; NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 5, 1993. 
10. See, e.g., Sylvia Rubin, The New Lesbian Chic, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1993, at B3; Eliza-
beth Snead, Lesbians in the Limelight, USA TODAY, July 13, 1993, at lD; Kara Swisher, We 
Love Lesbians/ Or Do We? 'Hot' Subculture - or Just Hurtful Stereotypes, WASH. POST, July 
18, 1993, at Cl. 
11. Before this book was published, there was no single text adaptable to use in a law school 
course about sexual orientation and the law. The books treating legal issues relating to gay men 
and lesbians most comprehensively were NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS 
AND GAY MEN (3d ed. 1992) (a handbook published by the American Civil Liberties Union that 
sets out, in question-and-answer format, the current state of the law on a broad range of topics); 
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (Roberta Achtenberg & 
Karen B. Moulding eds., 6th release 1993) (a treatise); THE EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1990) (a broad narrative survey of "legal 
problems faced by gay men and lesbians" adapted from a law review article); cf. ARTHUR S. 
1912 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:1910 
The publication of Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law provides an 
opportunity to reflect upon how legal education might be part of the 
process of negotiating the relationship between sexual orientation and 
law. In this review I focus on two aspects of the book that can yield 
important insights concerning this question: its pedagogy and its po-
tential to institutionalize courses covering homosexuality in the law 
school curriculum. 
I. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW AS PEDAGOGY 
A. Overview and Organization of the Book 
Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law is ambitious in scope and inven-
tive in pedagogy. The book covers a wide array of topics and traverses 
many conventional legal domains. It principally emphasizes constitu-
tional, criminal, family, and antidiscrimination law, but it also covers 
issues implicating tort, property, contract, probate, and immigration 
law. While this impressive sweep of subject matter strengthens the 
book, Rubenstein wisely eschews doctrinal organization in favor of a 
more imaginative, thematic approach. The book begins with an intro-
duction and a first chapter providing some conceptual tools for think-
ing about the law and homosexuality (pp. xv-76); it ends with two 
essays by activists that reflect upon the past and future of the gay 
rights movement (pp. 563-68). In between are the five principal chap-
ters, each of which corresponds to a major aspect of gay and lesbian 
life: "The Regulation of Lesbian and Gay Sexuality" (pp. 77-154); 
"The Regulation of Lesbian and Gay Identity: Coming Out- Speak-
ing Out - Joining In" (pp. 155-242); "Lesbians and Gay Men in the 
Workplace" (pp. 243-376); "Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay 
Relationships" (pp. 377-474); and "Lesbian and Gay Parenting" (pp. 
475-562). 
Among its other virtues, this organization effectively communi-
cates the idea that institutionalized discrimination still pervades the 
lives of gay men and lesbians. As the book moves to each area in 
which formal exclusion and stigma are still the rule, the materials 
powerfully evoke the sense of sequential legal and social barriers that 
many gay men and lesbians will find familiar. 
Rubenstein richly documents these legal barriers. For example, 
the early chapter on regulation of sexual activity focuses on the central 
American legal text regarding homosexuality, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Bowers v. Hardwick. 12 In Hardwick, the Supreme Court re-
jected a privacy-based challenge to a law criminalizing consensual 
LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEGAL CASES (1993) 
(collecting major cases concerning sexuality more generally); RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN 
(OUT)LA w (1992) (a collection of the author's essays relating to lesbians and the law). 
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (reprinted at pp. 132·48). 
May 1994] Poised 'at the Threshold 1913 
sodomy. Although the Court decided only that the constitutional 
right to privacy did not invalidate Georgia's sodomy law, the decision 
is often invoked by opponents of gay and lesbian rights as a broader 
trump card.13 Indeed, some courts have reasoned that, if the Consti-
tution permits the criminalization of gay sexual activity, then gay men 
and lesbians cannot claim heightened protection from discrimination 
under the rubric of the Equal Protection Clause.14 Materials in this 
and later chapters (pp. 341-67, 502-03) enable readers to consider just 
how long a legal shadow Hardwick casts. To its credit, the book poses 
this relatively abstract, doctrinal question without losing sight of the 
excruciatingly human dimension of the case and of the larger issue it 
raises. Juxtaposed with the Hardwick majority opinion's disembodied 
references to "criminalized consensual sodomy" (p. 132) is an inter-
view with Michael Hardwick, in which he recounts the very concrete 
story of being arrested while making love in his bedroom (pp. 125-31). 
As the book moves from sexuality to other aspects of gay and les-
bian lives, it continues to paint a picture of broad legal constraint. 
Successive chapters document, for example, that under federal antidis-
crimination law and the cognate laws of forty-two states, employers 
may still lawfully fire people based on their sexual orientation;15 that 
gay men and lesbians remain formally relegated to the outside of pow-
erfu1 cultural institutions like marriage and the military; 16 and that, in 
13. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1733-40 (1993) (discussing the multiple contexts in which 
opponents of gay rights broadly deploy rhetoric about sodomy in general and Hardwick in 
particular). 
14. In the chapter on discrimination, the book includes the opposing opinions on this ques-
tion from Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), a.ffd. en bane on other 
grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990), reprinted at pp. 342-67. 
See also Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993),judgment vacated, rehg. en bane granted, 
No. 91-5409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994); Woodward v. United States, 
871F.2d1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 
97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reprinted at pp. 319-25. For thoughtful analyses of the implications of 
Hardwick for equal protection claims, see Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Gay and Lesbian 
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1612-41 (1993); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of 
the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
915 (1989); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992); Cass 
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988). 
15. Pp. 243-334. The book lists seven states, in addition to the District of Columbia, with 
gay civil rights protection: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin. P. 270. Since the book's publication, Minnesota has become the eighth 
state to enact such a law. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). In 
addition, the book notes that some municipalities include sexual orientation in antidiscrimination 
ordinances even when the relevant state law does not. P. 270. 
16. Pp. 377-430, 334-75. The book was published before the advent of the "don't ask, don't 
tell" policy governing gay men and lesbians in the military. See supra note 2. Notwithstanding 
the attention generated by its adoption, the policy appears to represent only a minor change from 
the previous policy. See John Lancaster & Ann Devroy, Clinton Plan Bars Most Gay Conduct, 
WASH. Posr, July 17, 1993, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Military Praises Gay Policy for Ambiguity and 
Caution, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at Al4. 
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the context of family law, gay men and lesbians struggle daily to main-
tain or to establish legal bonds with their children (pp. 475-562). As 
the book explores the ways in which gay men and lesbians are subject 
to pervasive forms of disadvantage, moreover, Rubenstein does not 
treat the experience of homosexuality as a monolith. By incorporating 
the perspectives of African Americans and Latinos, for example, 17 the 
book enables teachers to explore the ways in which race, like gender, 
ethnicity, and class, can fracture, influence, and intersect the experi-
ence of homosexuality. 
Even as the book chronicles the continuing institutionalized subor-
dination of gay men and lesbians, however, Rubenstein adeptly cap-
tures the ambiguous state of the struggle for gay and lesbian equality. 
That struggle is more a story of overlapping progress, regress, and sta-
sis than one of unbroken defeat. Since the contemporary movement 
for what was once termed gay liberation began in 1969 with a riot at a 
New York City bar raided by police one too many times, 18 much has 
changed for gay men and lesbians in this country. In addition to not-
ing important dimensions of cultural and social change, 19 the book 
provides good coverage of the legal victories thus far. Rubenstein 
notes, for example, the elimination of twenty-six state sodomy laws 
since 1961 through repeal or invalidation (pp. 80, 87-88); the hard-
won enactment of civil rights laws in several states and municipali-
ties20 and domestic partnership ordinances in several municipalities 
(pp. 439-43); judicial decisions in some states affording gay men and 
lesbians the right to adopt a partner's biological child21 or rejecting 
homosexuality as a per se basis for denying custody or visitation (p. 
492); the movement in some cases toward a more functional definition 
of family (pp. 448-61); and several important free speech victories (pp. 
167-77, 215-16, 223-28). To be sure, the ideological and political right 
has greeted many of these advances with redoubled activism, and anti-
17. See, e.g., pp. 40-45 (reprinting Richard Goldstein's interview with James Baldwin, in 
which Baldwin discusses, among other things, how the "sexual question and the racial question 
have always been entwined"); pp. 239-42 (reprinting Charles Fernandez's essay Undocumented 
Aliens in the Queer Nation, in which Fernandez criticizes "queer nationalism" that takes the 
form of a "white-led movement with limited racial consciousness"); pp. 476-80 (reprinting 
Audre Lorde's essay Man Child: A Black Lesbian Feminist's Response, in which Lorde reflects 
upon her experience as a lesbian parent and notes that "Black children oflesbian couples have an 
advantage because they learn, very early, that oppression comes in many different forms, none of 
which have anything to do with their own worth"). 
18. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL (1992); Cain, supra note 14, at 1580-83. 
19. See, e.g., pp. 62-68 (reprinting a Ronald Bayer essay describing the process that 
culminated in the American Psychiatric Association's ceasing to view homosexuality as a disease 
in 1973); pp. 188-92 (reprinting a John D'Emilio essay describing the improved climate for gay 
men and lesbians on university campuses, while noting continuing areas of concern). 
20. P. 270. See supra note 15. 
21. Pp. 532-36. In the wake of the New York trial court decision reported in the book (pp. 
532-36), two state supreme courts have recognized the right of a lesbian to adopt her partner's 
biological child. Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Adoption ofB.L.V.B., 628 
A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). 
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gay violence seems with dismaying consistency to accompany the as-
sertion of gay rights.22 Nevertheless, the slow, if interrupted, 
accretion of legal victories reflects that supporters and opponents of 
gay rights have engaged the social and legal debate. 
B. Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries 
Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Law is anchored by a central pedagog-
ical choice: to be relentlessly interdisciplinary in presenting the mate-
rial. The book presents a deeply contextual picture of gay and lesbian 
lives - a picture in which the reader can see legal rules and doctrines 
as part of a larger social and cultural landscape. This contextuality is 
reflected, for example, in the very organization of the book. By focus-
ing on aspects of gay and lesbian lives - the workplace or parenting 
- instead of on legal constructs - equal protection or privacy - the 
book enables students and teachers to step outside particular doctrinal 
vacuums and to consider how legal, social, cultural, and political 
forces fuse and interact to create rules and attitudes about 
homosexuality. 
Rubenstein's interdisciplinary perspective is, moreover, apparent 
in the contents of every chapter in the book. He consistently inter-
weaves with standard legal sources - such as cases, statutes, and law 
review articles - rich and illuminating materials from other disci-
plines that document the historical, social, and political aspects of gay 
and lesbian lives and struggles. He draws from history, medicine, poli-
tics, psychology, fiction, poetry, autobiography, and popular culture. 
When I used parts of Rubenstein's then-unpublished materials in my 
own course on sexual orientation and the law at the University of Wis-
consin Law School, this diversity of material strongly encouraged stu-
dents to think hard about law reform, its limits, and its sometimes 
elusive interaction with the social forces that surround and shape law. 
Reading about the experiences of individual gay men and lesbians and 
about the changing social history of homosexuality in the United 
States gave students important perspectives on the caselaw they stud-
ied. For some students, these perspectives were new; for others, they 
were quite familiar. In either case, the readings enriched the range 
and quality of class discussion. 
The book's approach to the question of gay marriage is a good 
example. Rubenstein might well have limited his treatment of the sub-
ject to the thoughtful and well-edited collection of legal texts he 
presents. In addition to a necessarily succinct statement of the ex-
isting law on marriage between same-sex partners - no American ju-
risdiction currently permits it - the book includes portions of the 
22. I consider this backlash, and its implications for gay rights and civil rights law more 
generally, in Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse 
of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994); see also Note, supra note 4. 
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caselaw rejecting challenges to the gay marriage ban as unconstitu-
tional, 23 as well as Loving v. Virginia, 24 which declared unconstitu-
tional a Virginia statute banning marriage between people of different 
races.25 The book also includes materials about other ways that gay 
men and lesbians have sought to structure their relationships in lieu of 
marriage, such as contractual arrangements, domestic partnership 
where available, and the adoption of one partner by another (pp. 431-
47). The book also communicates the many practical consequences of 
the marriage ban in two ways: by concisely listing the many rights 
and benefits that are granted automatically upon marriage (pp. 430-
31) and by including cases and notes that explore these consequences 
in more depth - including the tragic battles over guardianship that 
can ensue when one partner in a couple is incapacitated and her bio-
logical family seeks to sever contact with her lesbian partner.26 
These materials would have been perfectly adequate, but the book 
paints a far richer and more complex picture than these legal texts 
alone could have yielded. Also included, for example, are materials 
probing the experiences of gay and lesbian couples within a social and 
legal framework that systematically marginalizes their relationships. 
Especially effective here are narratives from inside gay and lesbian re-
lationships, which teachers can use to give texture and particularity to 
the psychic reality oflovers who forge relationships within a repressive 
cultural regime. The book includes, for example, the late Audre 
Lorde's Tar Beach, in which Lorde explores the particular ways in 
which a love affair with another African-American woman affected 
her with "the resonance and power of an emotional tattoo" (pp. 378-
86). The book also includes Paul Butler's At Least Me and Rafael 
23. This is one of several places in the book where the perils of trying to cover such a rapidly 
evolving area are apparent. The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, potentially 
historic for gay men and lesbians, was apparently handed down too late to appear in the book. 
That decision, which returned the case to a lower court for trial, strongly suggests that Hawaii's 
ban on gay marriage violates the state's equal rights clause. See supra note 5. Only the interme-
diate appellate court's decision in Baehr is mentioned in the book. P. 418. 
24. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (reprinted at pp. 391-96). 
25. Pp. 391-96. On the relevance of Loving to the ban on gay marriage, see Sylvia Law, 
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; Andrew Koppelman, 
Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Low as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); 
and James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marrioge and the Miscegenation Anal-
ogy, 13 B.U. L. REV. 93 (1993). 
26. Pp. 448-74. Prominently featured here is In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 
790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (reprinted at pp. 468-74), which is an icon of sorts in the gay and 
lesbian community because it so dramatically captures the vulnerability of partners who are 
unable to marry. The case involves Sharon Kowalski who, after suffering disabling injuries in a 
car accident, became the subject of a fierce struggle between her parents and her long-time les-
bian partner Karen Thompson. During the protracted battle, Kowalski's parents sought to bar 
Thompson from seeing Kowalski. Ultimately, that attempt failed when an appellate court found 
that Kowalski had the capacity to express her preference and that she clearly wanted to remain 
with her partner. The ordeal is one from which married couples are spared by virtue of next-of· 
kin laws. For a trenchant analysis of the Kowalski case and its implications for gay and lesbian 
couples, see Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Dissent and the Family, NATION, Oct. 7, 1991, at 406. 
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Tried, which describes a relationship between two men that ends when 
one partner cannot sustain the relentlessly hypennasculine affectations 
that his lover Rafael demands. The story powerfully suggests a link 
among Rafael's demands, his partner's self-concept, and the internal-
ized homophobia of both {pp. 386-90). These stories can lay a founda-
tion for a probing consideration of the deeper social consequences of 
delegitimating gay and lesbian relationships. They evoke, at once, so 
many things: the ways in which love and passion seem universal; the 
intense emotional terrain that gay and lesbian lovers inhabit together, 
in the face of a society that widely denies or derides the existence of 
their relationship; and the ways in which that terrain can be a source 
of both joy and pain. 
The materials on gay marriage are yet more complex, for they en-
able readers to go beyond considering only the fairness of excluding 
gay men and lesbians. While squarely presenting questions of equity 
and constitutionality, the book also permits teachers to explore ques-
tions about social practice and strategy. The book notes, for example, 
that, notwithstanding the legal ban on marriage, a relatively high per-
centage of gay couples wear rings ·or have had a commitment cere-
mony of some kind, and some newspapers now carry gay "wedding" 
announcements (p. 420). In addition to describing these social prac-
tices, the book poses the provocative nonnative question of whether 
gay men and lesbians ought to seek the right to marry at all. Ruben-
stein includes what has become a classic exchange within the gay and 
lesbian community, in which gay rights lawyers Paula Ettlebrick and 
Tom Stoddard debate whether securing the right of gay marriage is a 
worthy or liberating goal. 27 Ettlebrick argues that the institution of 
marriage has perpetuated the subordination of women and should not 
provide the model for gay and lesbian unions (pp. 401-05). Stoddard, 
by contrast, argues that the ban on gay marriage is central to the 
broader subordination of gay men and lesbians and that opening mar-
riage to homosexuals will necessarily transform the institution (pp. 
398-401). Readers are invited into that debate and, in the process, to 
think hard about the linkage among legal structures, historical experi-
ence, and the dynamics of social change. 
In the end, the interdisciplinary emphasis of the book is a source of 
great pedagogical strength. In part, this is because integration of non-
legal materials makes the book much richer and more interesting than 
27. Pp. 398-405. The Ettlebrick-Stoddard exchange has spawned a growing literature on 
this question, including Symposium, The Family in the 1990s: An Exploration of Lesbian and 
Gay Rights, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (1991). Excerpts from that symposium appear in notes in 
the book that follow the Ettlebrick-Stoddard exchange. Pp. 405-06. For more recent perspec-
tives on this question, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 19 VA. L. 
REv. 1419, 1486-511 (1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing 
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Mar-
riage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993). 
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a traditional casebook would have been. However, the major contri-
bution of the diverse material is to enable teachers to call into question 
the autonomy of legal rules about sexual orientation. By its very com-
position, the book presses the reader to think, not only about law and 
doctrine, but also about how larger social structures and beliefs infuse, 
shape, and help to constitute law. That enterprise is central to think-
ing about gay and lesbian issues, and law and inequality more gener-
ally. Struggles for equality are and should be waged in legal domains, 
but they cannot be confined there. With or without law reform, the 
battle must likewise be waged in social and cultural domains,28 and 
this book adroitly underscores that point. 
C. The Paradigm Search 
One of the most salient aspects of contemporary gay rights de-
bates, in both the judicial and legislative arenas, is the search for a way 
to think about sexual orientation and the stance the law ought to take 
in relation to it. We are, in a fundamental sense, debating how to 
think about some basic questions: What is sexual orientation? What 
are its origins in individuals? What are its origins as a social category? 
What is its significance in people's lives? Should we make sexual ori-
entation a generally impermissible criterion of decision or exclusion, as 
race is, and as gender sometimes is? Do ideas about civil rights apply 
to sexual orientation with the same force as they apply to other bases 
of protected group status? How should we think about the larger 
community's interest in forging sexual norms in a pluralist democ-
racy? These sorts of questions underscore the need for more sharply 
conceptualizing the legal significance of homosexuality. For those in-
terested in pursuing gay justice, the evolution of such conceptual 
frameworks will, inevitably, be an important part of shaping how rules 
and doctrines governing sexual orientation are made and remade. 
This ongoing search for premises and paradigms poses important 
challenges for teaching sexual orientation and the law. Unlike other 
areas of civil rights law, for example, where the country has reached at 
least a formal - if lamentably thin - social and legal consensus, no 
clear consensus has yet to emerge in relation to homosexuality. In-
deed, given Hardwick, teaching a course about sexual orientation and 
the law today is, in this respect, something like teaching race and the 
law would have been after Plessy 29 and before Brown,· 30 much is still 
up for grabs. In a contemporary course about race or gender discrimi-
nation, for example, discussion is likely to focus on the forms, legiti-
macy, and efficacy of particular legal remedies and doctrines, but few 
28. I explore the symbiotic relationship between legal and social forces relating to homosexu· 
ality in more depth in Schacter, supra note 22. 
29. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
30. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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will challenge the general proposition that overt discrimination is 
wrong and properly made illegal. As communicated by recent public 
debates about gays in the military and the enactment of gay civil rights 
laws, however, the same cannot yet be said in the context of 
homosexuality. 
This instability and flux makes clear the centrality of developing 
paradigms in this area of law as we sort through the "metaquestions" 
that are as yet unanswered. Social and legal theory are, in this sense, a 
vital part of the enterprise of thinking about sexual orientation and the 
law, in the classroom and beyond. Unfortunately, the book does not 
emphasize theoretical materials considering these sorts of questions. 
While the materials otherwise draw from a wide and rich array of dis-
ciplines, there are relatively few readings from social and legal theory 
that engage the large and overarching questions. Rubenstein is mind-
ful of these kinds of questions, as the introductory and first chapters, 
which I describe below,31 provide some material that speaks to the 
larger questions at stake. Given his considerable abilities, however, 
the book left me wishing that he had both expanded and further inte-
grated materials of this kind. This is true in terms of what some call 
contemporary lesbian and gay studies or queer theory, strains of which 
follow the lead of Michel Foucault32 and emphasize the·ways in which 
sexuality is socially constructed. 33 It is also true in terms of more gen-
eral theories and critiques about some of the legal doctrines that figure 
centrally in the law relating to sexual orientation, such as privacy and 
equality theory.34 · 
The introductory chapter lays the intellectual groundwork for the-
oretical explorations by presenting material that illustrates how the 
very conception of homosexuality has shifted among social domains 
- from a theologically based model of "sin" to a medically based 
model of "sickness" to a socially based, contested model of "identity" 
31. See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. 
32. The leading work is 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hur-
ley trans., Vintage Books 1978) (1976). 
33. Good examples include FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL 
CoNSTRUCTIONIST CoNTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed., 1990); THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 
READER (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993); Teresa de Lauretis, An Introduction: Queer Theory: 
Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, 3 DIFFERENCES iii (1991). For work exploring the question of 
social construction expressly within the context of law, see several of the contributions in Sympo-
sium on Sexual Orientation and the Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a 
Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REAsoN 
(1991)). 
34. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 33; Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche To-
gether? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 
U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992); Halley, supra note 14; Law, supra note 25; David A.J. Richards, 
Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800 (1986); Sunstein, 
supra note 14; Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992); 
Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 
98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985). 
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(pp. 1-76). This chapter includes some of Kinsey's famous research 
modeling sexual orientation as a continuum, rather than a heterosex-
ual-homosexual dichotomy (pp. 1-15). It also includes a summary of 
recent research suggesting an innate, organic basis for sexual orienta-
tion (pp. 15-20). Finally, it includes an essay by historian John Bos-
well that discusses the constructivist-essentialist debate about sexual 
orientation that has become so central to scholars interested in gay 
and lesbian studies (pp. 21-25). That debate explores whether homo-
sexuality is a stable, continuous, and transhistorical construct, consist-
ently traceable through different eras and social arrangements, or, 
instead, whether it is fluid, historically contingent, and culturally 
constructed. 35 
These materials in the opening chapter give teachers building 
blocks for questioning the very concept of homosexuality and explor-
ing what theorist Eve Sedgwick calls the questions of ontogeny - the 
origins of same-sex attraction in individuals - and phylogeny - the 
origins and ramifications of the category homosexual to describe such 
attraction. 36 But some of the richest pedagogical opportunities lie in 
working with these kinds of questions within the context of specific 
legal issues. 
For example, the origins of homosexuality figure prominently in 
traditional equal protection doctrine, which treats the "immutability" 
of a group characteristic as relevant to determining whether such a 
characteristic is a suspect classification that triggers heightened scru-
tiny. 37 Immutability is one way to talk about the notion, implicit or 
explicit in many approaches to civil rights questions, that discrimina-
tion is somehow least defensible when based on a characteristic not of 
an individual's own "making." The chapter in the book covering dis-
crimination against gay men and lesbians in the workplace thus offers 
a highly relevant context for exploring the new scientific research sug-
gesting an organic basis for homosexuality,38 critiques of that new sci-
entific work, 39 normative critiques of immutability as an element of 
35. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Poli-
tics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REv. 1833, 1833 (1993). The sources cited in note 33, supra, 
explore these questions in depth. 
36. EVE K. SEDGWICK, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 40 (1990). 
37. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion); see Hal-
ley, supra note 14. 
38. For the leading recent studies, see SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN (1993); J. 
Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES 
OF GEN. PSYCH. 1089 (1991); and Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on 
the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321 (1993). For a good overview, 
see generally Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1993, at 47. 
39. See, e.g., William Byne & Bruce Parsons, Human Sexual Orientation: The Biologic Theo-
ries Reappraised, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 228 (1993); Darrell Y. Rist, Sex on the Brain: 
Are Homosexuals Bom That Way?, NATION, Oct. 19, 1992, at 424. 
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equality doctrine,40 and literature exploring the link between the ori-
gins of homosexuality and its social construction.4 1 
A similarly appropriate context for thinking about these questions 
is the chapter on parenting. Decisions involving the right of gay men 
and lesbians to child custody, visitation, or adoption, for example, fre-
quently consider whether homosexuality may be "learned" by a child 
raised by gay or lesbian parents (pp. 484, 496, 502, 506, 513). Putting 
aside the value-laden assumption that such learning would necessarily 
be bad, 42 this set of legal issues presents an opportunity to explore how 
people come to identify themselves as gay or lesbian, as well as the 
implications of particular ways of thinking about that question. 
In a different way, the chapter on regulation of sexual activity 
would have been enriched by readings exploring and critiquing the 
premises of liberal privacy theory. The book contains excellent mater-
ials on the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence, its decision in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 43 and the law before and after Hardwick Justice 
White's opinion for the majority in Hardwick and Justice Blackmun's 
dissent stake out classic positions on the right of privacy. These posi-
tions roughly correspond to those represented in the famous Hart-
Devlin debate provoked by the recommendation of the British 
Wolfenden Committee to decriminalize consensual homosexual acts.44 
Justice White emphasizes the community's prerogative to set moral 
standards through criminal law, echoing Devlin; Justice Blackmun 
emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, the centrality of 
sexual orientation to "personhood," and the claim that consensual 
adult homosexuality visits no harm upon others, echoing Hart. 
Although Hardwick captures these important poles of thought about 
liberal privacy theory, standing outside privacy theory and interrogat-
ing its premises can meaningfully deepen and enrich the debate.45 
Several critical perspectives on privacy theory in general, and regu-
lation of sodomy in particular, can be useful in expanding the debate. 
40. See Halley, supra note 14. 
41. See supra note 33. 
42. On the cultural depth of this assumption, see SEDGWICK, supra note 36, at 42. 
43. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reprinted at pp. 132-48. 
44. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW, 
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); see also Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and 
Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1093-98 (1988) (correlating Hardwick opinions with the Hart-Devlin debate). 
45. Although Hardwick has - at least for the moment - resolved the privacy-based chal-
lenge to sodomy statutes under federal law, state courts are still grappling with the issue under 
state constitutions. Rubenstein notes that, since Hardwick, courts in Kentucky, Michigan, and 
Texas have struck down sodomy statutes based on state constitutional provisions. P. 153. More-
over, core premises of liberal privacy theory are centrally in play in the larger debate about gay 
rights insofar as that debate frequently focuses on the uncertain boundary between individual 
freedom and community values. Thus, privacy theory remains fertile ground for exploration, 
notwithstanding the Hardwick result. 
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Rubenstein briefly alludes to the progressive-communitarian critique 
of privacy theory, which challenges the insistence on government neu-
trality that is central to liberal notions of privacy. A note following 
Hardwick excerpts portions of political theorist Michael Sandel's plea 
for moral argument in constitutional values, as opposed to an ideology 
of disinterested toleration.46 Sandel argues that constitutional rules 
must embrace, not bracket, substantive questions of "the good." His 
conception of privacy would accord constitutional protection to gay 
and lesbian sexuality because of "the human goods the practices real-
ize," not the "autonomy the practices reflect" (p. 150). Another 
strand of the progressive-communitarian critique, not included in the 
book, appears in work pursuing principles of civic republicanism. In 
this context, critics focus on including traditionally marginalized 
voices - including those of gay men and lesbians - in community 
dialogue and collective deliberation about conceptions of the good. 47 
These kinds of critiques challenge, from the left, the traditional liberal 
insistence on state agnosticism about moral choices and pursue a more 
affirmative case for homosexuality. 
Given the increasing progressive appetite for communitarian 
claims like these, 48 Rubenstein might have expanded the brief excerpt 
from Sandel that he includes. Had he done so, the book could have 
usefully probed the premises of progressive communitarianism more 
generally. Left-inspired calls for shared communal values create a di-
lemma. While progressive communitarians frequently make such ar-
guments in defense of gay rights, these claims recall - ominously, if 
unintentionally - the conservative defense of community values that 
so strongly characterized the Hardwick majority opinion. Liberal re-
sponses to progressive communitarianism provide a good vehicle for 
exploring this dilemma in greater depth. 49 
Rubenstein does not incorporate three other potentially useful per-
spectives on privacy theory. Each one stands outside the privacy de-
bate and, by offering a critical perspective, can contribute to the search 
for paradigms. First, feminist critiques of privacy theory explore the 
ways in which insulating the private sphere from state interference can 
oppress women. Such work views legal rules rooted in concepts of 
individual autonomy as having a gendered quality, or at least a 
46. See pp. 150-51. The article excerpted is Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal 
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989). It is part of the thought-
ful Symposium on Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CAL. L. REv. 475 (1989). 
47. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law'.!- Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
48. See generally Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Politics and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. 
L. REv. 685 (1992); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); cf. 
William A. Galston, Clinton and the Promise of Communitarianism, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., 
Dec. 2, 1992, at A52 (exploring the communitarian aspects of the Clinton agenda). 
49. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1989); Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988). 
May 1994] Poised at the Threshold 1923 
gendered history, that is sometimes masked, and it argues that privacy 
theory has functioned to protect the prerogatives of men and the insti-
tution of private property.50 Ruthann Robson has done some of this 
work expressly within the framework of lesbian sexuality.s1 She ar-
gues that, at best, privacy-based legal theories create a private sanctu-
ary for sexual behavior, but not a public space for multidimensional 
lesbian lives. s2 
Second, the work of Michel Foucault supports another critique of 
liberal privacy theory. This critique challenges the assumption that 
sexual orientation is, as Justice Blackmun argued, central to "per-
sonhood," by questioning whether it is inevitable or desirable to label 
people and fix their identity based upon sexual orientation. s3 Foucault 
explored the ways in which we may see homosexuality as an artifact of 
culture by distinguishing sexual acts from the more complex constella-
tion of ideas and ideologies that we know as "sexuality."s4 For Fou-
cault, the category homosexual, once socially invented, became a 
diverse and diffuse source of oppression. ss Privacy theorists inspired 
by Foucault thus emphasize the many ways in which power can be a 
menace to freedom. Whereas the sole object of liberal privacy theory 
is the government's negative power to repress, arguments from Fou-
cault emphasize the ways in which power can also be affirmative or 
constitutive, as when diverse, multidisciplinary forces - for example, 
law, medicine, science, religion - create categories like homosexual. 
Such categories can themselves be systematically, yet often quite co-
vertly, enmeshed with state power and deployed to support social 
structures of oppression. s6 Thus, these critiques argue that privacy 
theory must look beyond narrow conceptions of the government's reg-
ulatory power and contend, as well, with the way the state shapes, 
supports, and affects these multiple cultures and structures of 
intolerance. s7 
Third, an economic critique of privacy theory and approach to reg-
50. See, e.g, CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINISr THEORY OF THE STATE 184-
94 (1989); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND 
AMERICAN LA w 269-72 (1990); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology 
and Legal Refonn, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) .. 
51. See RUTHANN ROBSON, Sexual Privacy, in ROBSON, supra note 11, at 63-71. Rubenstein 
draws on another of Robson's essays exploring the application of sodomy statutes to lesbian 
sexual activity (pp. 80-87) but does not include her critique of privacy doctrine. 
52. ROBSON, supra note 51, at 63-71. 
53. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989); Stephen J. 
Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. 
REv. 861 (1991); cf. Halley, supra note 13, at 1739-40. 
54. See Ortiz, supra note 35, at 1833 (noting that "Foucault separated sexuality from sex"); 1 
FOUCAULT, supra note 32. 
55. 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 32. 
56. See Rubenfeld, supra note 53, at 770-82; Schnably, supra note 53, at 895-900. 
57. See Rubenfeld, supra note 53, at 799-802; Schnably, supra note 53, at 931-54; cf. Thomas, 
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u1ating sexuality is developed most notably in the work of Richard 
Posner. In his recent book, Sex and Reason, 58 Posner argues against 
sodomy statutes, but he attempts to recast the debate as one about the 
efficacy, not the morality, of such statutes. Posner's work is highly 
controversial, and there is much with which to argue. The strength of 
his claim to pure empiricism and the wisdom of his approach raise 
questions that students and teachers can fruitfully explore within the 
rubric of traditional privacy theory.59 Moreover, much of what he 
treats as fact about gay men and lesbians is easily unmasked as cul-
tural mythology. For example, Posner describes gay men as not only 
"effeminate" but "artistic," "neurotic," and "histrionic," and lesbians 
as "the opposite of effeminate."60 Perhaps unwittingly, Posner thus 
usefully illustrates the persistence of stereotypes among even sophisti-
cated observers and the degree to which legal policies and decisions 
can be based on such misapprehension. 
The absence of extended treatment of theoretical materials like 
those that I have described does not mean that Lesbians, Gay Men, 
and the Law is "antitheory," for Rubenstein goes much further in this 
direction than the average casebook. Indeed, the diversity of source 
material in the book itself may reflect a theory of sexual orientation 
and the law by implicitly making the point again and again that social 
values and attitudes powerfully shape law in this area. 61 Thus the 
book fits nicely within recent work exploring the socially constructed 
character of sexual orientation62 and within the larger rubric of "law 
and society" work.63 Nevertheless, the book bypasses an important 
opportunity to probe in depth some of the pressing questions of theory 
and paradigm that I have described, and it may thus be somewhat 
supra note 34, at 1435-36, 1478-92 (drawing upon Foucault and calling for a more "corporal" 
conception that looks to the ways in which sodomy laws legitimate antigay violence). 
Foucault's work is relevant beyond the domain of privacy law, for it implicates the ways in 
which legal categories and constructs can shape and affect social forces. See SEDGWICK, supra 
note 36, at 3. At a relatively high level of abstraction, Foucault's idea that the category homosex-
ual has been deployed to oppress may undermine the very notion that legal recognition of homo-
sexuals as a group is a path to liberation. See Halley, supra note 13, at 1739-40. That notion is 
deeply embedded in gay law reform strategies that seek constitutional and statutory protections 
for gay men and lesbians comparable to those that the law has accorded other historically 
subordinated groups. 
58. POSNER, supra note 33. 
59. For some critiques of Posner pursuing these kinds of questions, see Eskridge, supra note 
33; Commentary on Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L. REv. 471 (1993) (including commentaries by 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Ruthann Robson, and Martha Albertson Fineman). 
60. POSNER, supra note 33, at 304. 
61. Rubenstein is, in fact, explicit about this point in his introduction. P. xxi. 
62. See supra note 33. 
63. For a good overview of perspectives on law and society, see ALAN HUNT, EXPLORA· 
TIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CoNSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993); Stewart 
Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAW & POLY. 149 
(1984); David Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short Happy Life of the Law and Society Move· 
ment, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 2 (1990). 
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limited in its ability to encourage students to think critically about 
these kinds of questions. Those using Rubenstein's book as a central 
course text may thus choose to supplement the book with additional 
readings. 
II. LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW AS 
CURRICULAR CATALYST 
One of the most exciting and important aspects of Lesbians, Gay 
Men, and the Law is its potential to help institutionalize the teaching 
of sexual orientation and the law in law schools. As a pathbreaker, the 
book can influence curricular development by enabling law professors 
with an interest in the area to offer a course without having to under-
take the daunting task of assembling their own materials. 
This contribution is important because, as the debate about sexual 
orientation and the law rages outside the law schools' doors, courses 
focusing on gay and lesbian legal issues are still relatively rare. In a 
1990 survey of institutions belonging to the American Association of 
Law Schools, Professor Gene Schultz reported that 117 of 158 law 
schools responded to a 1990 questionnaire soliciting information 
about, among other things, course offerings relating to sexual orienta-
tion. 64 Of the 117 schools responding, only thirty-five offered at least 
one course "focusing" on gay and lesbian legal issues. 65 Of these 
thirty-five, some. listed courses as general as "Civil Rights," "Feminist 
Legal Theory," and "Gender and the Law" as gay and lesbian focus 
courses.66 Moreover, fully ten of the thirty-five schools list courses 
about AIDS as such focus courses. 67 Although AIDS has, of course, 
ravaged the gay male community, it is neither a "gay disease," nor do 
many of the legal issues it raises relate in any way to sexual orienta-
tion. 68 When these factors are taken into account, the 1990 survey 
documents fewer than a dozen schools offering courses clearly devoted 
to sexual orientation and the law. This number may have increased in 
the last few years as the profile of the gay rights debate has risen, but 
the low 1990 baseline makes it likely that it is still the exception, not 
the rule, to offer a course of this type at American law schools. 
The absence of course offerings is unfortunate for a number of rea-
sons, three of which I want to emphasize. First, law schools are train-
64. Gene P. Schultz, The Inclusion of Sexual Orientation in Nondiscrimination Policies: A 
Survey of American Law Schools, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 131, 135-37 (1992). 
65. Id. In this respect, law schools appear to be following the rest of the academy, where gay 
and lesbian focus courses are still relatively sparse. See Larry Gordon, Opening the Door to Gay 
Studies, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1993, at Al (reporting results of a National Lesbian and Gay Task 
Force survey of college courses). 
66. Schultz, supra note 64, at 136-37. 
67. Id. 
68. See generally Scorr BURRIS ET AL., Ams LAW TODAY (1993); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET 
AL., AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1989). 
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ing lawyers who, with increasing frequency, will be asked to represent 
gay and lesbian clients. This is true not only because litigation is one 
important channel for the gay and lesbian equality demand. It is true, 
as well, because the existence of broad-based social structures of exclu-
sion triggers gay and lesbian reliance on alternative legal structures. 
In the absence of the right to marry, for example, gay and lesbian 
couples frequently enter contracts involving jointly held property and 
child custody in the event that a relationship dissolves. 69 Lawyers 
need to understand the issues that such contracts raise and the con-
texts in which they arise. 10 
Second, law schools are also training many of tomorrow's execu-
tive and legislative policymakers, judges, and legal scholars. If we 
want people in these positions to be able to think intelligently about 
the pressing social and legal questions raised by the gay and lesbian 
demand for equality, we need to give them the skills and information 
to do so. Had some of our national politician-lawyers been educated 
to think in a more rigorous, sophisticated way about sexual orientation 
and the law, for example, the recent debate about the ban on gays in 
the military might have moved beyond the depressing caricature of 
predatory gay men and lesbians that so crucially structured the discus-
sion. 71 Perhaps the outcome would not have differed, but the debate 
might at least have been staked out on the terrain of fact, not fantasy. 
Third, and relatedly, one of the forces that most powerfully drives 
homophobia is the, traditional invisibility of gay and lesbian life. It is 
always easier to hate, or at least to fear, what you do not know - or, 
to be more precise, what you do not know that you know. 72 That is one 
reason that the gay abstraction wields such cultural power and that 
opponents of gay rights link homosexuality with a range of myths and 
stereotypes - such as predatory sexual behavior. 73 Invisibility in law 
69. Pp. 430-39, 554-62. See generally HAYDEN CuRRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL 
GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY CoUPLES (Robin Leonard ed., 1991). 
70. See Bill O. Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender. 
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 
1810 (1993) (arguing that a lawyer needs to understand "personal identification issues" because 
"[c]ommon sense, without training, is dangerously fashioned by our own class, race, ethnicity/ 
culture, gender, and sexual background"). 
71. See, e.g., Frank Browning, From "Poof" to "Predator": The Military Gay Ban Debate 
Cuts to the Heart of Our Fear of Homo-Sex, WASH. PoST, Mar. 28, 1993, at C4; David Tuller, 
Gays Fight Image as Sexual Predators, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1993, at Al. 
72. For example, poll findings frequently reflect that those who know people they know to be 
gay or lesbian are far more supportive of lifting legal restrictions on gay men and lesbians than 
those who do not. See, e.g., William Schneider & I.A. Lewis, The Straight Story on Homosexual-
ity and Gay Rights, PUB. OPINION, Feb.-Mar. 1984, at 16, 18-20; see Fajer, supra note 34. 
73. For a wide-ranging and thoughtful refutation of this and other stereotypes about gay men 
and lesbians, see Fajer, supra note 34. See also the useful compilations of data with similar 
findings in Laurence R. Helfer, Note, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of 
Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044 (1990); Steve 
Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward 
a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852, 870-84 (1985). 
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school curricula follows larger social invisibility. A course in sexual 
orientation and the law can, as Rubenstein's book shows, add to the 
historically incomplete picture of gay and lesbian lives that prevails in 
our culture and shapes our legal rules and doctrines. Thus, such a 
course can, in the most classic sense of education, expand what people 
know, whether they are lawyers, lawmakers, or judges.74 In the pro-
cess, such a course can convey to our gay and lesbian students that, in 
a world still hostile to them, their law schools take their lives and 
struggles seriously enough to provide course coverage. 75 
This educative value of studying sexual orientation and the law, 
moreover, extends beyond expanding what people know about the 
legal treatment of gay men and lesbians. The study of sexual orienta-
tion and the law is intellectually rich and can shed important light on 
a host of other issues - such as the regulation of sexuality and sexual 
activity more generally, the relationship between legal rules and gen-
der roles, the role of law in supporting or suppressing difference, and 
the boundary line between individual and communal rights. As illus-
trated by the deep and difficult questions raised by liberal privacy the-
ory, 76 many exciting jurisprudential debates converge in controversies 
about sexual orientation and the law. Thus, the subject may be of 
interest to many students and teachers who have given little thought 
to the issues. 
A specific course on sexual orientation and the law is, of course, 
not the only way to realize the various aspirations I have set out. As is 
the case with gender and race, 77 questions relating to sexual orienta-
tion arise across the curriculum. As a result, coverage of gay and les-
bian issues in "core" courses is equally vital.78 It may, in fact, be more 
74. For an argument in favor of gay studies pursuing this sort of theme, see Martha Nuss-
baum, Why Gay Studies? A Classical Defense, NEW REPUBLIC, July 13 & 20, 1992, at 26; cf. 
Stephen Reinhardt, The Court and the Closet: Why Should Federal Judges Have to Hide Homo-
sexuality?, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at CJ (a federal judge advocating the appointment of 
openly gay or lesbian judges because, among other reasons, "[d]iversity on the bench tends to 
increase judicial understanding regarding the nature of the problems that come before us," and 
can help "to reduce the level of our natural prejudices and intolerance"). 
15. Cf. David A.J. Richards, Liberal Political Culture and the Marginalized Voice: Interpre-
tive Responsibility and the American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1955, 1977 (1993) (arguing 
that "[c]ritical public culture is not challenged and deepened if women, homosexuals, and other 
marginalized groups in law schools are largely acculturated there not to engage the issues central 
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important because these courses will reach many more students than 
will electives focusing only on sexual orientation and law. 
The question of whether specific courses on gay and lesbian issues 
are preferable to general coverage recalls larger debates about ethnic, 
women's, and gay studies programs. One aspect of that debate is 
whether such targeted programs "ghettoize" emerging fields of study 
or blunt the development of more general course offerings that take 
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tion. By influencing the way future lawyers think about these issues, 
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